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Revenue Rulings and Other Publications: 1963
MITCHELL ROGOVIN
Assistant to the Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
Washington, D. C.
RULINGS PROGRAM-BACKGROUND
In 1963, the tenth year of the Service's broadened ruling publication
program, some 300 rulings were published. These pronouncements by
the Service represent rulings, procedures, instructions or other communi-
cations involving substantive tax law or procedures affecting taxpayers'
rights or duties.' Since it is the stated policy of the Service that tax-
payers may rely upon rulings published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin
-whenever "the facts and circumstances are substantially the same" as
the published ruling'-analysis of the key Service rulings becomes an
important part of tax practice.
KEY INDIVIDUAL RULINGS
Revenue Rulings 63-20' deals with obligations issued by a non-profit
corporation formed under state law to stimulate industrial development
in a political subdivision of a state. Under section 103 of the Code,
interest on the obligations of a state or its political subdivision are ex-
cluded from gross income. The regulations4 provide that the issuance of
obligations "on behalf of a state or its political subdivision" are also
within the ambit of section 103. In the light of the increased use of the
nonprofit industrial development corporation, the ruling focuses on when
the obligations of such an entity are issued "on behalf of" a political
subdivision.
Rev. Rul. 63-20 describes five conditions which must be met before
interest on the corporate obligations will be considered excludible from
gross income:
'See statement of ruling policy, Rev Rul 2, 1953-1 C.B. 484 and Rev Rul 212,
1953-2 C.B. 499. Early land marks in formulating a publication program are
found in Sen. Couzens' 1925 investigation of the Bureau (S. Rep. 27, Part I,
69th Gong., 1st Sess.) ; the 1941 Attorney General's Committee on Administra-
tive Procedure (S. Doc No. 10, Part 9, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.); and the 1953
inquiry into Service ruling policy and practice. (Report to the Subcommittee
of the Committee on Ways and Means by the Subcommittee on Administration
of the Internal Revenue Laws, 1953)
2Rev Proc 62-28, Section 13.09, 1962-2 C.B. 496, superseding Rev Rul 54-172
Section 12.06, 1954-1 C.B. 401.
31963-1 C.B. 244Reg. section 1.103-1
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(1) The corporation must engage in activities essentially of a public
nature; (2) The corporation must not be organized for profit except
to the extent of retiring indebtedness; (3) The corporation income
must not inure to the benefit of any private person; (4) The political
subdivision must have a beneficial interest in the corporation while
the indebtedness is outstanding and will obtain full legal title to the
property at the retirement of the indebtedness; and (5) The political
subdivision must approve the corporation as well as the obligations.
Revenue Ruling 63-645 is an outgrowth of the Berlin crisis of
1961 and deals with travel expenses. Under Public Law 87-117 the
President is authorized to order units of the Ready Reserve to active
duty for not more than one year. Since some reservists did not abandon
their private business and others will return to their prior employment
the question arose as to the deductibility of travel, meals and lodging
while on active duty. The problem was further heightened in that many
reservists received basic subsistence and quarters allowances. Two ques-
tions are answered by the ruling: (1) Is a member of the Ready Re-
serve in a travel status where he has not abandoned his civilian place of
business or employment; and if so (2) are his expenditures for meals
and lodging deductible while on temporary duty, i.e., where they exceed
the reservist's subsistence and quarters allowance.
Under Rev. Rul. 60-1896 the general rule was established that em-
ployment away from home under an actual or anticipated duration of
less than one year is normally regarded as being of a temporary char-
acter. Since temporary employment away from a principal or regular
place of duty puts the taxpayer in a travel status, the reservists who,
in effect, intends to return to his civilian business upon his release is
in travel status. Therefore, the reservists in this situation would be en-
titled to a deduction for the expenditures made for meals and lodging,
with two limitations. First, the deduction would initially be off-set by
the non-taxable quarters and subsistence allowance received. And second,
his expenses are limited to those directly attributable to his presence on
the military post. This latter caveat carves out expenses of the family
he might have brought with him to camp.
Revenue Ruling 63-777 concerns another travel expense problem:
whether payments or reimbursements by a prospective employer of ex-
penses incurred in connection with interviews are wages as far as the
prospective employee is concerned and whether the employer must with-
hold or pay employment taxes. The type of expense involved are gen-
erally the meals, lodging and round-trip transportation of the prospective
employee, normally to the main office of the employer.





with respect to the employment taxes and the withholding by the em-
ployer, the reimbursements are not wages. The reimbursements are also
excludable from gross income of the employee. This conclusion, that the
expenses are those of the prospective employer rather than the em-
ployee, is supported by earlier rulings. Rev. Rul. 55-555,8 (dealing with
reimbursed car-pool expenses); I. T. 4068, 9 (where a child-placement
agency paid the expenses of the placement of a child in a foster home) ;
Rev. Rul. 57-60,1° (a state kindergarten mileage law paid parents for
transporting their children). It is worth noting the facts ruled on in-
dicate the employee came to the interview at the invitation of the
employer under an agreement that the employer would pay the expenses.
In Rev. Rul. 63-91,11 the Service concerned itself with an unusual
facet of the medical expense deduction. This ruling holds that amounts
paid to a practitioner, such as a chiropractor, for treatment constitutes
"medical care" even though the practitioner is not licensed, certified or
otherwise qualified to perform the treatment.
The need for this interpretative position arose because the regula-
tions1 2 under section 213 provide "amounts expended for illegal opera-
tions are not deductible" and three published rulings implied a practi-
tioner must be qualified, authorized or licensed to practice his profession.
While the regulations under section 213 are interpreted in this ruling
to disallow expenses for operations or treatments that are illegal (e.g.,
an abortion), regardless of whether performed by a licensed practitioner,
the ruling is not intended to imply that amounts paid to an unlicensed
practitioner for "medical care" are not deductible. There is no require-
ment in the Code or regulations that the taxpayer ascertain whether a
practitioner is licensed or not before obtaining his services. The ruling
is intended to dispel any implication to the contrary.
Rev. Rul. 63-250'3 concerns the disposition of pending cases under
section 117 relating to the exclusion from gross income for scholarships
and fellowship grants where the facts are substantially identical to the
Bhalla or Spruch cases. 1 4 In these cases, the Tax Court held the
stipends received through university research programs, were primarily
to further the education and training of the taxpayers, hence excludible
from income under section 117. In both cases the taxpayers were can-
didates for Ph.D. degrees in physics and the research conducted for
their grant was also in satisfaction of the degree requirement. Further-






12Reg. Section 1.213-1 (e) (ii)
13I.R.B. 1963-48,91435 T.C. 13; 20 TCM 324.
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The ruling points out that further study is being made by Treasury
of the section 117 area and if the regulations issued are more restrictive,
they will be prospective in application.
CORPORATE RULINGS
Rev. Rul. 63-63 15 concerns the effect of the new investment credit on
the computation of earnings and profits. Under section 38 of the Code
the credit against income tax is provided for investment in certain types
of new or used depreciable property for the taxable year in which the
property is placed in service. Section 48 provides for an adjustment to
the basis of the property in order to reflect the credit. The result is a
reduction in income tax liability by the amount of the credit, thus pro-
viding the corporation with funds that otherwise would not be avail-
able. When there is an early disposition of the section 38 property, section
47 provides for an addition to the tax of a portion or all of the
original credit for the year of the disposition.
The ruling holds that under these circumstances it would be inappro-
priate in computing the earnings and profits to allow as a decrease
thereto, the gross amount of the income tax liability before reduction
by the amount of the investment credit. Similarly, the adjustment to
basis required by section 48 for the year the property is placed into
service may not be reflected as a reduction in earnings and profits that
year.'
6
Rev. Rul. 63-104 17 concerns the effect of a bankruptcy of an affiliate
on the filing of a consolidated return. The ruling holds that if an affili-
ated group is required to file a consolidated return for any taxable year,
the return must include the income or loss of the members adjudicated
bankrupt even though the trustee in bankruptcy refuses or fails to file
the consent form for the year. This would also seem to follow if there
is a receivership rather than a bankruptcy. In the case of a bankruptcy
or receivership, the court-appointed receiver or trustee may choose, be-
cause of one reason or another, not to join the affiliated group. Normally
he has got the losses and the rest of the group want them-thus, the
refusal to file a consolidated return. In effect the ruling says his failure
or refusal to file a consent is no ground for not filing the consolidated
return.
Rev. Rul. 63-11418 helps to construe one of the more difficult terms
151963-1 C.B. 10
16U.S. Tax Week (3-8-63) predicts "considerable discussion and litigation" re-
garding this position. The argument raised is that the benefit of section 38
is tied into the detriment of the section 48(g) loss in basis-it would therefore




in the collapsible corporation area; the word "construction." The term
is used in a number of places in section 341 and its meaning assumes
essential importance when, as here, a corporation has clearly engaged
in the "construction" of property in the past and now wants to know
when it has ceased such "construction." Section 341 (d) (3) provides that
collapsible treatment does not apply in the case of gain realized after
the expiration of the three years following the completion of "con-
struction". The question then is when does "construction" cease?
Since this is a highly factual question, the revenue ruling should be
examined closely with great care as to the facts. The facts in the ruling
indicate N corporation was clearly formed for the principal purpose of
erecting and owning an office building. It began construction in 1957
and by the end of 1958 the building was completely erected, leased
and occupied. During the next three years N incurred "construction type
expenses." The ruling examines the post-1958 expenses to determine
whether they constitute the continuation of old construction, new
construction or something else. Significantly, the stated facts are that
the post-1958 expenditures were relatively insignificant when compared
to the entire building. The ruling concludes that the character of the
building was not changed, the rental area was not increased; nor the
fair market value appreciably increased.
On these facts it was held the expenditures were made merely for
the purpose of modifying or altering existing property. The building in
effect was completed not later than December 31, 1958, and the
expenditures were not made for "construction" of property within the
meaning of section 341.
Rev. Rul. 63-11819 deals with the effect of interest from non-taxables
on the preferred position of a regulated investment company. To obtain
the conduit treatment offered under section 851, a regulated investment
company, among other requirements, must: (a) derive at least 90%
of its gross income from dividends, interest and gains from the sale of
stock or securities; and, (b) less than 30% of gross income must be
derived from the sale of stock or securities held less than three months.
In some situations a corporation could qualify as a regulated investment
company if it were permitted to off-set gains with losses and include
as gross income, tax exempt interest. The ruling holds that gross income
includes gross gains undiminished by losses. Further, tax exempt interest
cannot be included in gross income.
As to the first holding, the losses of the regulated investment company
are irrelevant to whether there has been speculative activity of the kind
discouraged by section 851(b) (3). The allowing of the losses to be
off-set against the gains as requested by the taxpayer in the ruling
191963-1 C.B. 121
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would run counter to this policy. As to the second holding, gross income
is not defined under section 851 or in the Investment Company Act
of 1940. In the absence of a specific definition, the ruling reverts back
to section 61 to define gross income. Under section 61, "gross income
. . . except as otherwise provided . . . means all income from whatever
source derived." One exception, section 103, is to the effect that gross
income does not include the interest on municipal obligations. Con-
sonant with this position the Service has held2 0 tax exempt interest
excludable from the gross income of a corporation for the purposes
of qualifying as a Western Hemisphere trade corporation.
Rev. Rul. 63-127 2 dwells on the question of elections under section
1033. This ruling deals with a taxpayer who paid the tax on gain realized
from an involuntary conversion and then reinvested the proceeds in
replacement property within the period when he could qualify for non-
recognition of the gain under section 1033 (a) (3).
In the example: 1960 the taxpayer sold a parcel of land under
the threat of condemnation and received the entire proceeds that year.
In the same year he reinvested a portion of what he received in re-
placement property. On his 1960 return the taxpayer reports gain and
pays the tax on the excess between the cost of the replacement property
and his sales price. In 1961 the taxpayer decides to make an election
under section 1033(a) (3) with respect to the unexpended portion and
reinvests this in replacement property. On his 1961 return all of this
is spelled out and he files a claim for refund for the amount paid in
1960. The ruling holds that the benefits of section 1033 (a) (3) are
available to the taxpayer on the basis of the claim for refund filed after
the expiration of the replacement period, but before the expiration of
the period of limitation for the assessment of the tax for the year in
which the gain was realized. The regulations2 2 provide for the filing of
a claim if the decision to make an election under section 1033(a) (3)
is made after the return is filed. No provision exists in that section to
provide guidance as to what constitutes an election or as to when the
election occurs. The ruling states, as a matter of fact, the taxpayer de-
cided to make the election under section 1033(a) (3) and reinvest the
proceeds in replacement property. The implication is timely reinvestment
itself amounts to the section 1033(a) (3) election.
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX
In June of 1962 a notice of proposed rule making was published to
the effect that replacement cost was the measure for estate and gift
2 0Rev Rul 57-435, 1957-1 C.B. 462
21IRB 1963-27, 10
2 2 Reg. section 1.1033(a)-2 (c) (2)
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tax valuation of mutual funds. There were hearings in the fall of
1962 and the final regulations have been published.2"
A mutual fund or open end investment company sells stock in itself.
Generally the public purchases the stock of an open end investment
company at a price determined by the fractional value of the funds
net assets, plus the load charge, (the expense of marketing the shares.)
The mutual fund receives the net asset value of each share sold. A
shareholder may redeem at the net asset value or "bid price" from the
mutual fund at any time, normally only however from the fund itself.
Originally the regulations under the 1954 Code had no provision re-
garding the valuation of mutual funds. Without any regulations or
rulings in this area there was no uniformity and some districts apparently
were using "bid price" as the quantum of value of the mutual fund
shares, others were using the "ask price," and still others found that
the mean between the two was the appropriate figure for valuation.
The general valuation principle involved throughout the estate and
gift tax area to determine fair market value is the willing buyer and
the willing seller concept. The willing buyer rule acknowledges an asset
can have a value in excess of liquidation value. In the case of the
mutual fund this would be the loan price.
The regulations equate the fair market value as including this loan
price. This is in line with, for example, the result where real estate is
sold. The value of the real estate is not diminished by the commissions
paid to the real estate agent. Similarly, when common stock is sold the
value of the stock is not lessened by the expenses of the seller. The
mutual fund charge is not an acquisition expense, but rather it is a
part of the price of the shares representing the selling expenses of the
mutual fund itself.24
CONCLUSION
This then was the year that was.
23Reg. section 20.2031-2, 8 and section 25.2512-6
24Support for the use of "asked price" can be found, for example, in Baltimore
Nat. Bank v. U.S. (D. Ct. 1955) 136 Fed. Supp. 642 (where securities retained
for appreciation or sold at sacrifice are valued in excess of liquidation value)
and Publicker v. Commissioner, (CA 3 1953) 206 F. 2d 250, cert. den. 346
U.S. 924, (included in valuation of jewelry the federal excise on retailers.)

